MODULE 02/22● LIVE TESTEDCLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED
Reconnaissance is not a phase — it is a mindset. Every attack, every breach, every successful operation begins with knowing the terrain better than the defender does. You cannot attack what you cannot see. This module teaches you to see everything: the network topology, the running services, the human targets, the certificate trails, and the privilege gaps that turn a foothold into total ownership.
Imagine you're a scout behind enemy lines. You don't fire a single shot. You count the guard towers, map the patrol routes, listen to radio chatter, and photograph the supply convoys. By the time the assault begins, the enemy has already lost — they just don't know it yet. That is reconnaissance. In cyberspace, the towers are firewalls, the patrols are IDS sensors, and the supply convoys are unpatched services. Learn to see them all.
"You cannot attack what you cannot see."
If you don't know a target exists, you can't exploit it. Reconnaissance is the work of making the invisible visible — subdomains, live hosts, open ports, user accounts, and misconfigurations. Every attack path starts with a discovery.
Red team: Map everything before touching anything. The best exploits target assets the blue team forgot they owned.
Blue team: You can't defend what you don't know you have. Asset inventory and attack surface monitoring are your first lines of defense.
Passive reconnaissance means gathering intelligence without ever touching the target network. No packets sent, no logs generated, no alerts triggered. The information is already public — you just need to know where to look.
WHOIS — The Domain's Birth Certificate
Every domain registration leaves a paper trail. WHOIS reveals the registrar, name servers, registration dates, and sometimes even the administrator's contact details.
// WHOIS lookup — domain registration details$whois rainfantry.github.ioDomain Name: GITHUB.IORegistry Domain ID: D503300000040403267-LRMSRegistrar WHOIS Server: whois.namecheap.comRegistrar URL: https://namecheap.comUpdated Date: 2024-01-15T08:23:17ZCreation Date: 2013-02-11T19:53:09ZRegistry Expiry Date: 2025-02-11T19:53:09ZRegistrar: NameCheap, Inc.Name Server: DNS1.P08.NSONE.NETName Server: DNS2.P08.NSONE.NETDNSSEC: unsigned// What we learned:// DNS provider = NSOne (modern cloud DNS, anycast)// Registrar = NameCheap (cost-conscious, not enterprise)// DNSSEC = unsigned (vulnerable to DNS spoofing / cache poisoning)// Creation 2013 = established domain, likely production
Why this matters
WHOIS tells you who manages the infrastructure. If the DNS provider is NSOne, you know the target uses modern cloud DNS. If DNSSEC is unsigned, you know the domain can be spoofed. If the registrar is NameCheap, you know the target is cost-conscious (not enterprise-grade). Every detail is a decision point. DNSSEC unsigned? That's a red flag for cache poisoning.
"Real attacks are carried remotely."
You don't need to be inside the building to break in. Most successful attacks start from the public internet — a leaked certificate, an exposed port, a public GitHub repo, or a misconfigured cloud service. Remote recon lets you map a target's weaknesses from anywhere in the world.
Red team: Start every engagement from the outside. Passive remote recon builds a target picture without ever triggering an alert.
Blue team: Audit your external footprint continuously. If you can find it on the internet, so can an attacker.
Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs — The Subdomain Goldmine
Every TLS certificate issued is logged publicly. These logs contain subdomains that may never appear in DNS brute-force lists. CT log monitoring is one of the most effective passive recon techniques.
// crt.sh — query Certificate Transparency logs for subdomains$curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.github.io&output=json" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sort -u*.github.io22nd-survey-division.rainfantry.github.ioblog.rainfantry.github.ioapi.rainfantry.github.iostaging.rainfantry.github.iodev.rainfantry.github.iomail.rainfantry.github.io// Subdomains discovered that were NOT in DNS brute-force:// api.rainfantry.github.io — likely backend, less hardened// staging.rainfantry.github.io — pre-production, often misconfigured// dev.rainfantry.github.io — development environment, wide open
Organizations forget that every certificate they request is public. Dev teams request certs for staging.internal.company.com and api-v2-dev.company.com without realizing these names are now in public databases. Attackers find them first. Staging environments are the soft underbelly of corporate security.
OSINT — Open Source Intelligence
OSINT is reconnaissance using public sources: social media, job postings, press releases, GitHub repositories, and employee LinkedIn profiles. The human perimeter leaks more than the network perimeter.
// GitHub reconnaissance — find code, commits, contributors$curl -s https://api.github.com/users/rainfantry | jq '{login, name, company, blog, location, email, public_repos, created_at}'{ "login": "rainfantry", "name": "George Wu", "company": "22nd Survey Division", "blog": "https://rainfantry.github.io/22nd-survey-division/", "location": "Sydney, Australia", "email": null, "public_repos": 92, "created_at": "2020-03-15T08:23:17Z"}// 92 public repositories = massive attack surface// Location = Sydney, Australia (timezone for timing attacks: UTC+10)// Company name = business context for phishing pretexts
# Enumerate all repositories with metadata
for page in 1 2 3 4 5; do
curl -s "https://api.github.com/users/rainfantry/repos?page=$page&per_page=100" | \
jq -r '.[] | "\(.name) | \(.language) | \(.updated_at) | \(.stargazers_count)"'
done | head -20
# Output:# 22nd-survey-division | HTML | 2026-06-29T08:44:03Z | 12# vader-rootkit | C | 2026-06-28T15:23:11Z | 8# iron-sun | C | 2026-06-27T09:45:22Z | 5# winrecon | Python | 2026-06-26T11:34:56Z | 3# ghost-encoder | Python | 2026-06-25T14:12:33Z | 2
Why this is dangerous
Every repository is a potential vulnerability. The C repositories (vader-rootkit, iron-sun) suggest Windows exploitation skills. The Python repositories (winrecon, ghost-encoder) suggest automation and data exfiltration. The HTML repository (22nd-survey-division) is the public face — potential XSS or injection targets. The update timestamps show active development — the target is skilled and current. Your GitHub is your resume — and your attack surface.
SECTION 02
Active Reconnaissance: Port Scanning & OS Detection
Active reconnaissance means touching the target. Port scans, service probes, banner grabs — this is where you get caught if you're careless. But it is also where you find the doors that passive recon missed.
Nmap — The Network Mapper
Nmap is the standard for network discovery and security auditing. A single SYN scan can reveal the entire attack surface of a target in seconds.
// Nmap SYN scan — fast, stealthy, no full TCP handshake$nmap -sS -p- 192.168.1.42Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org )Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.42Host is up (0.00032s latency).Not shown: 65530 closed portsPORT STATE SERVICE22/tcp open ssh445/tcp open microsoft-ds3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server5985/tcp open wsman5900/tcp open vnc// SSH (22) = remote admin, brute-force target// SMB (445) = file sharing, EternalBlue, lateral movement// RDP (3389) = remote desktop, credential target, BlueKeep// WinRM (5985) = PowerShell remoting, lateral movement// VNC (5900) = remote desktop, often weak/no passwords
OS Detection & Service Version Enumeration
Nmap's -O flag fingerprints the operating system by analyzing TCP/IP stack behavior. -sV probes open ports to determine service versions — critical for matching known exploits.
// Aggressive scan: OS detection + version detection + default scripts$nmap -sS -sV -O --script=default 192.168.1.42PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH for Windows 8.1445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows 10 1903 - 19093389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.05900/tcp open vnc VNC protocol 3.3Aggressive OS guesses: Windows 10 1903 - 1909 (95%)Network Distance: 1 hop// OS: Windows 10, likely 1903-1909 build// OpenSSH for Windows = PowerShell remoting available// VNC 3.3 = OLD, potential weak authentication// One hop = same network segment, no router in between
# Nmap cheat sheet for recon operators# Quick top-1000 ports (fastest)
nmap -sS -T4 target
# All ports, service versions, OS detection
nmap -sS -sV -O -p- -T4 target
# UDP scan (slow but finds DNS, SNMP, TFTP)
nmap -sU -p 53,161,69 target
# Scan with decoys to hide your source IP
nmap -sS -D RND:10 target
# Output to all formats (grepable, XML, normal)
nmap -sS -sV -O -oA recon_results target
⚠ Legal warning
Active reconnaissance without authorization is illegal in most jurisdictions. The scans shown here were performed on authorized lab machines (.92, .42, .145). Never scan systems you don't own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized port scanning can violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (US), the Computer Misuse Act (UK), and similar laws worldwide.
EVIDENCE
Live Scan: .42 (WUPC) — Full Reconnaissance
DATE: 2026-06-29 | TARGET: 192.168.1.42 | METHOD: Nmap SYN + version + OS
$nmap -sS -sV -O -p- --script vuln 192.168.1.42Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.42Host is up (0.00032s latency).Not shown: 65530 closed portsPORT STATE SERVICE VERSION22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH for Windows 8.1445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows 10 1903 - 19093389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.05900/tcp open vnc VNC protocol 3.3Aggressive OS guesses: Windows 10 1903 - 1909 (95%)Network Distance: 1 hop| smb-vuln-ms17-010:| VULNERABLE:| Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010)| State: VULNERABLE| IDs: CVE:CVE-2017-0143| Risk factor: HIGH| A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SMBv1| servers. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute| arbitrary code on the target system.
What we learned: Windows 10, likely 1903-1909 build. OpenSSH for Windows means PowerShell remoting is available. VNC 3.3 is old — potential weak auth. SMB is open — EternalBlue (MS17-010) confirmed vulnerable. One hop away = same network segment. This is a target rich environment.
SECTION 03
Network Mapping & Topology Discovery
Knowing which ports are open is not enough. You need to know how the network is wired: which hosts exist, how they connect, where the routers and firewalls sit, and which segments are reachable from your position.
Host Discovery with Ping Sweeps
Before scanning ports, you need to know which hosts are alive. Nmap's host discovery uses ICMP echo, TCP SYN, and ARP to find live targets.
// Ping sweep — find live hosts on a subnet$nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1Host is up (0.0012s latency).Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.42Host is up (0.00032s latency).Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.92Host is up (0.00045s latency).Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.145Host is up (0.00038s latency).// 4 live hosts discovered in the /24 subnet// .1 = likely gateway/router// .42, .92, .145 = lab targets (WUPC, SKYWALKER, etc.)
Traceroute & Path Analysis
Traceroute maps the network path between you and the target. Each hop reveals a router, firewall, or load balancer. The path tells you about network architecture and potential chokepoints.
// Traceroute to target — reveals network hops$traceroute 192.168.1.42traceroute to 192.168.1.42 (192.168.1.42), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets 1 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 1.234 ms 1.187 ms 1.203 ms 2 192.168.1.42 (192.168.1.42) 0.456 ms 0.412 ms 0.389 ms// Only 1 hop = same broadcast domain, no intermediate firewall// Direct layer-2 adjacency = ARP spoofing, MITM possible
Why network distance matters
One hop means the target is on the same switch or VLAN as you. No router, no firewall, no IDS inspecting inter-host traffic. This is the ideal environment for ARP spoofing, LLMNR poisoning, and SMB relay attacks. Distance = defense. One hop = no defense.
ARP Table & Neighbor Discovery
The ARP table on any compromised host reveals every other host it has recently communicated with. This is a free network map — no scanning required.
// ARP table on a compromised host — passive network mapC:\>arp -aInterface: 192.168.1.42 --- 0x12 Internet Address Physical Address Type 192.168.1.1 00-50-56-c0-00-08 dynamic 192.168.1.92 00-0c-29-3e-5a-1b dynamic 192.168.1.145 00-0c-29-7a-2f-4c dynamic 192.168.1.254 00-50-56-f2-3a-9e dynamic// 00-50-56 = VMware MAC prefix (virtual lab environment)// 00-0c-29 = VMware MAC prefix (more VMs)// .1 = gateway, .254 = likely DHCP server or secondary gateway
# Network mapping workflow# 1. Discover live hosts
nmap -sn 192.168.1.0/24 -oG live_hosts.txt
# 2. Extract IPs for targeted scanning
grep "Up" live_hosts.txt | awk '{print $2}' > targets.txt
# 3. Full port scan on discovered targets
nmap -sS -sV -O -iL targets.txt -oA full_recon
# 4. Check for default routes and neighbors on any foothold
ip route # Linux
route print # Windows
arp -a # Both
"Organized notes beat memorization."
You will drown in data during recon: IPs, ports, subdomains, users, hashes, and findings. Memory fails under pressure. A clean, repeatable note system — with commands, outputs, and timestamps — lets you spot patterns, compare scans, and hand off work without losing the picture.
Red team: Document every command and output. Your notes become the attack chain evidence and the foundation for reporting.
Blue team: Standardize how your team records indicators and findings. Consistent notes speed up incident response and post-mortems.
SECTION 04
Service Enumeration & Banner Grabbing
Once you know a port is open, you need to know exactly what is running on it. Service version, configuration, and banner text all inform exploit selection. Enumeration is the bridge between reconnaissance and exploitation.
Banner Grabbing with Netcat & Nmap
Many services greet connecting clients with a banner containing version information. This is often the first data exchanged on a TCP connection — no authentication required.
// Manual banner grab with netcat$nc -v 192.168.1.42 22Connection to 192.168.1.42 22 port [tcp/ssh] succeeded!SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_for_Windows_8.1// The banner reveals: OpenSSH for Windows, version 8.1// OpenSSH 8.1 for Windows = relatively recent, fewer known CVEs// But "for Windows" confirms the target OS family// HTTP banner grab with curl$curl -I http://192.168.1.42:5985HTTP/1.1 404 Not FoundContent-Type: text/html; charset=us-asciiServer: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 08:23:17 GMTConnection: close// Server header = Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0 (Windows native HTTP stack)// 404 on root = WinRM endpoint expects specific paths (/wsman)
SMB Enumeration — The Windows Goldmine
SMB (Server Message Block) is the protocol behind Windows file sharing. It is also one of the most attacked protocols in history. Enumerating SMB shares, users, and policies reveals lateral movement paths.
// Enumerate SMB shares with smbclient$smbclient -L //192.168.1.42 -NSharename Type Comment--------- ---- -------ADMIN$ Disk Remote AdminC$ Disk Default shareIPC$ IPC Remote IPCUsers Disk Public Disk // ADMIN$ and C$ are administrative shares — require admin credentials// IPC$ is the inter-process communication share — always accessible// Users and Public are user-created shares — potential data leakage// Enumerate SMB users via RPC$rpcclient -U "" -N 192.168.1.42 -c "enumdomusers"user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]user:[SWu] rid:[0x3e8]user:[WDAGUtilityAccount] rid:[0x3e9]// RID 0x1f4 (500) = built-in Administrator// RID 0x3e8 (1000) = first non-builtin user (SWu)// Guest account present = potential anonymous access vector
# SMB enumeration toolkit# List shares (null session)
smbclient -L //TARGET -N
# Connect to a share
smbclient //TARGET/Users -N
# Enumerate users, groups, shares with enum4linux
enum4linux -a TARGET
# Check for SMB signing (relay attack viability)
nmap -p445 --script smb-security-mode TARGET
# Check for EternalBlue (MS17-010)
nmap -p445 --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 TARGET
Why SMB is the crown jewel
SMB is the protocol of Windows networks. It carries file shares, printer access, and RPC traffic. If SMB signing is disabled, you can perform SMB relay attacks — capturing a hash and replaying it to another host. If MS17-010 is unpatched, you own the box with a single packet. SMB is not a service. It is a kingdom.
SNMP Enumeration — The Forgotten Protocol
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is designed for network monitoring. It is also designed to reveal everything: system names, running processes, network interfaces, routing tables, and installed software. And it often uses default community strings like "public" and "private".
// SNMP walk with default community string "public"$snmpwalk -v 2c -c public 192.168.1.42SNMPv2-MIB::sysDescr.0 = STRING: Hardware: AMD64SNMPv2-MIB::sysDescr.0 = STRING: Windows Version 6.3SNMPv2-MIB::sysContact.0 = STRING: admin@wupc.localSNMPv2-MIB::sysName.0 = STRING: WUPC-WIN10SNMPv2-MIB::sysLocation.0 = STRING: Sydney Datacenter// System contact reveals internal email format: admin@wupc.local// System name reveals hostname: WUPC-WIN10// Location reveals physical site: Sydney Datacenter// All of this from a single UDP packet to port 161
⚠ SNMP security reality
SNMPv1 and v2c transmit community strings in plaintext. SNMPv3 adds authentication and encryption but is rarely configured correctly. Many network devices still ship with community string "public" enabled. Always test SNMP first. It is the laziest win in reconnaissance.
SECTION 05
Privilege Audit with WINRECON
Once you have a foothold on a Windows host, the next reconnaissance target is the host itself. WINRECON is a PowerShell-based enumeration tool developed by the 22nd Survey Division. It performs a comprehensive privilege audit without requiring elevation — and it outputs a prioritized attack path.
WINRECON Architecture
WINRECON is a self-contained PowerShell script that runs as a standard user. It queries WMI, registry, and process information to build a complete picture of the target's security posture. It then scores four attack vectors: V4 DELTA (service replacement), V6 FOXTROT (PATH DLL hijack), V7 GOLF (phantom DLL), and ECLIPSE (AMSI+ETW bypass).
// WINRECON execution — standard user, no elevationPS C:\>powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File sw_recon.ps1================================================================ SKYWALKER RECON -- 22DIV / george wu Target: WUPC-WIN10 Date: 2026-06-29 08:23:17 User: SWu================================================================
System Identity & User Context
WINRECON begins by fingerprinting the operating system, hardware, and user context. This tells you what exploits are viable and what privileges you currently hold.
// SECTION 1: SYSTEM IDENTITY Hostname: WUPC-WIN10 OS: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro 10.0.19044 Build: 19044 Architecture: 64-bit Domain: WORKGROUP CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9700K RAM: 16.0 GB BIOS: VMWare Virtual Platform Install Date: 2023-01-15 08:23:17 Last Boot: 2026-06-29 06:45:12// SECTION 2: USER & PRIVILEGE CONTEXT Username: WUPC\SWu SID: S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1001 Auth Type: NTLM Is Admin: True// Group Memberships: WUPC\SWu (S-1-5-21-...-1001) BUILTIN\Administrators (S-1-5-32-544) BUILTIN\Users (S-1-5-32-545) NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE (S-1-5-4)// Token Privileges (exploitable): SeImpersonatePrivilege = Enabled ← GOLDEN TICKET SeDebugPrivilege = Enabled SeBackupPrivilege = Enabled SeRestorePrivilege = Enabled
Why SeImpersonatePrivilege is everything
SeImpersonatePrivilege allows a process to impersonate the security context of another user. If you have this privilege and there is a service running as SYSTEM that connects to a named pipe you control, you can steal that SYSTEM token. This is the foundation of the Potato family of exploits (JuicyPotato, PrintSpoofer, GodPotato). If you have SeImpersonate, you have a path to SYSTEM.
Defender & Security Configuration
WINRECON queries Windows Defender status, UAC configuration, and virtualization-based security (VBS/HVCI). This tells you what post-exploitation techniques will work.
// SECTION 4: DEFENDER / AV STATUS AMRunningMode: Normal RealTimeProtection: True BehaviorMonitor: True IsTamperProtected: False ← CRITICAL AntivirusEnabled: True AMProductVersion: 4.18.2305.0// SECTION 3: UAC & SECURITY CONFIG ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = 5 EnableLUA = 1 PromptOnSecureDesktop = 1// SECTION 5: VBS / HVCI / SECURE BOOT DeviceGuard\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity = 0 HVCI Enabled = (not set) SecureBoot = (not set)// Analysis:// Tamper Protection OFF = Defender can be disabled after SYSTEM escalation// UAC level 5 = prompt for consent on secure desktop (standard)// VBS/HVCI not enabled = kernel drivers and unsigned code viable
⚠ Tamper Protection is the gatekeeper
When Tamper Protection is enabled, even SYSTEM cannot disable Windows Defender. When it is disabled, achieving SYSTEM means you can turn off real-time protection, exclude your payload directory, and operate with impunity. Always check Tamper Protection before planning post-exploitation.
Service Enumeration & Privilege Escalation Hunt
WINRECON's most powerful feature is its automated hunt for privilege escalation vectors. It checks for writable service binaries, unquoted service paths, services running from user profiles, and phantom DLL imports.
// SECTION 7: SYSTEM SERVICES — PRIVESC HUNT Total privileged services: 187 [CRITICAL] SVC_WRITABLE -- Service 'HealthSecurityHost' (LocalSystem) EXE WRITABLE: C:\Program Files\HealthApp\SecurityHost.exe DIR WRITABLE: C:\Program Files\HealthApp// SECTION 9: SCHEDULED TASKS (SYSTEM/HIGHEST) SYSTEM/Highest tasks checked: 23, writable: 1 [CRITICAL] TASK_WRITABLE -- Task 'AdobeUpdateTask' (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) writable dir: C:\ProgramData\Adobe\Updater// SECTION 10: PATH VARIABLE Writable PATH dirs: 1 C:\Users\Public\Tools// SECTION 18: PRIVESC QUICK CHECKS AlwaysInstallElevated (HKLM): NOT SET (secure) AlwaysInstallElevated (HKCU): NOT SET (secure) LoadAppInit_DLLs: 0 (disabled) [CRITICAL] DANGEROUS_PRIV -- Token has SeImpersonatePrivilege [!] SeImpersonate present -- Potato attacks viable
# WINRECON key findings decoder# SVC_WRITABLE = Replace the service binary with your payload# sc stop VulnerableService# copy payload.exe "C:\Program Files\App\Service.exe"# sc start VulnerableService → SYSTEM shell# UNQUOTED_PATH = Space in path without quotes# C:\Program Files\App\Service.exe# Place payload at C:\Program.exe → Windows executes it first# TASK_WRITABLE = Replace task executable directory# The task runs as SYSTEM from a directory you control# PATH_WRITABLE = DLL hijack opportunity# Place malicious DLL in writable PATH directory# Named to match a DLL loaded by a SYSTEM process
Phantom DLL Hunting
WINRECON includes a pure PowerShell PE import parser that scans SYSTEM service binaries for DLL imports that do not exist on disk. These "phantom" DLLs can be planted in a writable PATH directory, causing the service to load attacker-controlled code as SYSTEM.
// SECTION 19: PHANTOM DLL HUNTING KnownDLLs count: 31 Writable PATH dirs: 1 C:\Users\Public\Tools Scanning 187 SYSTEM services... Services scanned (unique binaries): 42 Phantom DLLs found: 3 [CRITICAL] PHANTOM_DLL -- Service 'ClickToRunSvc' (LocalSystem) NORMAL-imports 'osppc.dll' -- NOT ON DISK PLANTABLE via writable PATH Service: ClickToRunSvc (Microsoft Office Click-to-Run) Account: LocalSystem Binary: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe Phantom: osppc.dll (NORMAL-load) Plantable: True
Why phantom DLLs work
When Windows loads a DLL, it searches a specific order: application directory, system directories, PATH directories. If a SYSTEM service imports a DLL that does not exist, and you can place a DLL with that name in a writable PATH directory, Windows will load your DLL into the SYSTEM process. This is not a bug — it is how Windows DLL loading works. The absence of a file is the vulnerability.
// SKYWALKER VECTOR ASSESSMENT (SECTION 20) +---------------------------------------------------+ | V7 GOLF (phantom_dll) Score: 95/100 | +---------------------------------------------------+ [+] Office ClickToRunSvc detected [+] osppc.dll confirmed PHANTOM (not on disk) [+] Writable PATH dir available for DLL plant +---------------------------------------------------+ | V4 DELTA (svc_replace) Score: 80/100 | +---------------------------------------------------+ [+] 1 writable SYSTEM service(s) found Target: HealthSecurityHost at C:\Program Files\HealthApp\SecurityHost.exe +---------------------------------------------------+ | V6 FOXTROT (path_hijack) Score: 70/100 | +---------------------------------------------------+ [+] 1 writable dir(s) in machine PATH [+] Phantom DLL targets available for PATH plant +---------------------------------------------------+ | ECLIPSE (AMSI+ETW) Score: 80/100 | +---------------------------------------------------+ [+] Tamper Protection OFF -- Defender can be stopped after achieving SYSTEM [+] HWBP bypass requires no elevation (standard user) =================================================== RECOMMENDED ATTACK PATH: PRIMARY: V7 GOLF (score 95) FALLBACK: V4 DELTA (score 80) ECLIPSE: VIABLE ===================================================
What we learned: WINRECON identified three viable privilege escalation paths on .42 without requiring elevation. The highest-scoring path is V7 GOLF (phantom DLL hijack via osppc.dll) with a score of 95/100. The host has Tamper Protection disabled, meaning post-SYSTEM we can disable Defender. This host is configured to be compromised.
SECTION 06
Interactive Quizzes
Test your reconnaissance knowledge. Each quiz reinforces a critical concept from this module.
QUIZ 1: You run nmap -sS -p- 192.168.1.10 and see port 445/tcp open. What is the most critical next step?
A) Check for SMB signing and MS17-010 vulnerability
B) Attempt an SSH brute-force on port 445
C) Send a phishing email to the administrator
D) Perform a DNS zone transfer
QUIZ 2: WINRECON reports SeImpersonatePrivilege = Enabled for your current user token. What does this mean?
A) You can directly modify the Windows registry as SYSTEM
B) You can impersonate client tokens and potentially escalate to SYSTEM via named pipe attacks
C) You have full administrative access to all files
D) You can disable Windows Defender without elevation
QUIZ 3: During passive recon, you discover a subdomain staging.api.target.com via Certificate Transparency logs. Why is this significant?
A) It proves the target uses cloud hosting exclusively
B) Staging environments are often less hardened than production and may expose debug endpoints or default credentials
C) It guarantees the presence of a SQL injection vulnerability
D) Certificate Transparency logs are always encrypted and cannot be accessed by attackers
SECTION 07
Lab Exercise: Full Reconnaissance Cycle
Perform a complete reconnaissance cycle against an authorized lab target. Document every finding and build an attack path.
Passive recon: WHOIS, CT logs, DNS enumeration on target domain
Host discovery: Ping sweep the authorized subnet
Port scanning: Nmap SYN scan all live hosts, then version + OS detection
Service enumeration: Banner grab all open ports; enumerate SMB, SNMP, HTTP
Privilege audit: Run WINRECON on any Windows foothold; document scores
Passive recon is invisible: WHOIS, CT logs, DNS, and OSINT generate no logs on the target. They are free, legal, and devastatingly effective.
Active recon is noisy but necessary: Port scans, version probes, and banner grabs trigger IDS/IPS. Use decoys, slow scans (-T0), and authorized windows.
Network mapping reveals architecture: Traceroute, ARP tables, and subnet scans show how the target is wired. One hop = direct attack surface.
Service enumeration bridges recon to exploitation: SMB signing, MS17-010, SNMP community strings, and HTTP headers all inform the next move.
WINRECON automates the privilege audit: A single PowerShell script scores four attack vectors and recommends a path to SYSTEM. Run it on every Windows foothold.
SeImpersonatePrivilege = SYSTEM: If you have it, you are one named pipe away from god mode. If you don't, hunt for writable services, unquoted paths, and phantom DLLs.
Staging environments are soft targets: CT logs and DNS brute-forcing reveal subdomains that are less hardened than production. Always check them.